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ABSTRACT
We consider a duopoly in which each firm has one owner and one 
manager playing a multi-stage delegation game. The decision of 
each firm consists of two stages. In the first stage, the owner offers 
his manager a contract based on profits and sales. In the second 
stage, the manager chooses its output or price. Several possible 
sequential games will be analysed, depending on the sequence of 
the strategic variables. In the first scenario in which firm 1 makes a 
contract decision and a producing decision sequentially, and firm 2 
follows in the same fashion, we show that any delegation equilibrium 
in which both owners commit their managers to profit-maximising 
behaviour disappears. In the second scenario in which the firms 
first enter into the contract stage and then Stackelberg competition 
follows in the second stage, sales-based delegation occurs. If firms 
compete in quantities, second mover advantage appears if firms 
make simultaneous delegation contracts, while first mover advantage 
is recovered if they make sequential contracts. If firms compete in 
prices, the results are reversed.
1. Introduction
Do firms really maximise profits? Is it the case that profit maximisation increases the long-
run viability of firms? Alchian (1950) advocated the profit maximisation hypothesis on the 
grounds that natural selection results in the survival of only the profit maximisers in the long 
run. Friedman (1953) also argued that surviving firms are those that attained the highest 
profits. These arguments led to the wide acceptance of the profit maximisation hypothesis.
On the other hand, the managerial theory of the firm has proposed that firms in reality 
do not necessarily behave like profit maximisers. Given the separation of management from 
ownership, the firm’s manager maximises his own utility function rather than the profit 
of the firm. Also, Baumol (1958) suggested sales maximisation as an alternative objective 
function of firms.
The profit maximisation hypothesis and the managerial theory of the firm seemed to 
have been irreconcilable until Vickers (1985), Sklivas (1987) and Fershtman and Judd (1987) 
presented a two-stage strategic delegation game in which profit-maximising owners in the 
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first stage offer a contract to their managers and managers in the second stage compete 
given the contracts.1 They showed paradoxically that firms can maximise profits by dele-
gating to non-profit-maximising managers. More specifically, they proved that in a two-
stage Cournot game, each firm’s owner will twist his manager’s incentive away from profit 
maximisation in order to commit them to more aggressive behaviour during the output 
competition stage, thereby becoming a Stackelberg leader. Thus, both firms’ owners have 
incentives to delegate decisions to their managers. Then, in equilibrium, they end up with 
higher output and lower profits than in the Cournot Nash equilibrium, which is exactly 
like a prisoner’s dilemma situation.
The literature on strategic delegation hitherto nonetheless neglects the possibility that a 
firm can be a Stackelberg leader in delegating decisions without paying much attention to 
the sequence of delegations. A Stackelberg leader in the output market competition does 
not necessarily imply a Stackelberg leader in delegation contracts. A Stackelberg leader 
in the output market may offer a contract earlier than the rival firm or later or simultane-
ously without observing the contracts of the other. That is, Stackelberg leadership in two 
stages (delegation stage and producing stage) should be distinguished. This distinction is 
important, especially when one firm plays as a Stackelberg leader in the output market. One 
of the most interesting issues that arise in this situation is whether one firm or the other 
firm can strengthen its Stackelberg leadership or countervail the rival firm’s leadership by 
sequential strategic delegation.
In this article, we will consider a duopoly in which each firm has one owner and one 
manager playing a multi-stage delegation game. The decision of each firm consists of two 
stages. In the first stage, the owner offers his manager a contract based on profits and sales. 
In the second stage, the manager chooses its output or price. Depending on the sequence of 
the strategic variables of the firms, we can think of several possible sequential games. The 
first scenario is a model in which firm 1 makes a contract decision and a producing decision 
sequentially, and then firm 2 follows the decisions in the same fashion. We show that any 
sales-based delegation equilibrium disappears in this model, in other words, both owners 
commit their managers to profit-maximising behaviour. The second scenario involves a 
situation in which the firms first enter into the contract stage and then Stackelberg com-
petition follows in the second stage. Two cases will be considered. In the first case, firms 
make contracts simultaneously, and in the second case, they make contracts sequentially. 
The outcome will turn out to be very sensitive to the nature of strategies, whether they are 
strategic substitutes or strategic complements. If firms engage in quantity competition, we 
will show that there is a second mover advantage in the first case in the sense that firm 2 
choosing its quantity level later than firm 1 enjoys higher profit, and that first mover advan-
tage reappears in the second case. The intuition for the first result is that firm 2 is provided 
a new opportunity to commit to more aggressive behaviour by the delegation contract prior 
to quantity competition, and the intuition for the second result is that firm 1 can circumvent 
firm 2’s strategic delegation by his additional upfront contract. If firms compete in prices, 
the advantages are reversed. In the first case, there is first mover advantage, while there is 
second mover advantage in the second case.
The Korean entertainment market can serve as an interesting example. Among three big 
record companies in Korea, YG Entertainment, which successfully released rapper Psy’s 
music video ‘Gangnam Style’, is known to often use a ‘running guarantee’, a contract form 
based on sales rather than profits, whereas its competitor JYP Entertainment does not often 
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use a running guarantee. It is also known that its share prices saw a year-over-year increase of 
more than 60% and were currently higher than the share prices of the other two competing 
entertainment companies. Considering that YG Entertainment is the last entrant, this may 
suggest the importance of the entry sequence and the delegation contract, although it is 
not clear due to the inherent complexity of the entertainment industry whether or not the 
current market shares are a direct consequence of the running guarantees.
There are several papers asserting that firms can have second mover advantages. Gal-Or 
(1985) showed that the second mover has the advantage if the reaction curves of the firms 
are upward sloping, as in the case of price competition. Amir and Stepanova (2006) strength-
ened the result of Gal-Or (1985) with the general demand. Rasmusen and Yoon (2012) 
argued that when one firm has superior information, there is a second mover advantage as 
the informed player’s information is more accurate, because delay can prevent the spillover 
of this information. Bonatti and Martina (2004) and Kopel and Löffler (2008) also showed 
second mover advantages in a similar setting of quantity competition rather than price 
competition. Our article is distinguished from these two papers in the sense that it covers 
more general cases. The second mover advantage they identified falls under only a special 
case in our model.
The article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. In Sections 3 and 
4, we analyse the case of quantity competition and the case of price competition respectively. 
Concluding remarks follow in Section 5. All the proofs are contained in the appendix.
2. Model
We consider a duopoly in which each firm has one owner and one manager playing a 
multi-stage delegation game. The decision of each firm consists of two stages. In the first 
stage, the owner offers his manager a contract. In the second stage, the manager chooses 
its output or price given the contract.
It is assumed that contracts take a particular form: managers are paid in proportion 
to some linear combination of profits and revenues (sales).2 Formally, firm i’s manager is 
offered the following form of contract,
 
where πi and Ri are firm i’s profits and revenues. Here, αi is chosen by owner i strategically. 
Since two firms are involved in our model, there are four strategic variables, α1, α2, x1 and 
x2, where xi can be either qi (output) or pi (price). We will consider several sequential games, 
depending on the sequence of the four strategic variables.
The first scenario we consider is that firm 1 makes sequential decisions α1 and x1, and 
then firm 2 follows the decisions in the same fashion. This corresponds to the case in which 
firm 1 is a market-dominating incumbent whose decisions are well known to other firms. 
We will call this a model of sequential firm decisions. In the second scenario, we consider 
the situation in which the firms first enter into the contract stage and then Stackelberg 
competition follows in the second stage. This setup is consistent with the reality that con-
tracts are often made on a long-term basis, whereas output or price decisions are more 
flexible. We will also divide the second scenario into two cases. In the first case, firms 
make contracts simultaneously, and in the second case, they make contracts sequentially. 
The former corresponds to the case that both firms are incumbents despite a difference in 
(1)Oi = ii + (1 − i)Ri,
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size, and the latter corresponds to the case that firm 1 is an incumbent and firm 2 is a new 
entrant. We will call the former a model of simultaneous delegation, and the latter a model 
of sequential delegation.
Due to the sequential nature of the games we consider, we will use the subgame perfect 
equilibrium as our main solution concept. In characterising equilibria, we will assume 
throughout the article that all the previous moves of the players are common knowledge. 
It will turn out that differences in information in alternative models lead to significant 
differences in the outcome.
3. Quantity competition
We examine three models of duopoly Cournot competition in a homogeneous good market. 
For tractability, we assume that demand is linear:
where Q = q1 + q2 is total output or market demand and P is market price. We also assume 
that firms have common marginal cost c (> 0) which is constant. Then, we have πi = (P − c)qi 
and Ri = Pqi. The values of parameters a, b and c are all common knowledge. To ensure 
qi > 0, we assume that a > c.
3.1. Model of sequential firm decisions (Model Q - I)
In this model, firm 1 (or its owner) makes a contract with its manager by choosing α1 and 
then the manager chooses its output q1 in the first stage, and in the second stage, firm 2 
and its manager pick α2 and q2 sequentially. We will use backward induction to find the 
subgame perfect equilibrium.
Given α2 and q1, manager 2’s best-response function is given by
 
It directly follows from maximising O2 = (P - α2c)q2 = (a - b(q1 + q2) - α2c)q2. By substituting 
equation (2) into the profit function, we obtain the indirect profit function for the owner 2:
 
Note that the profit (the owner’s payoff) of firm 2 depends on α2 as well as q1. Also, note 
that the contract of the other firm (firm 1), which can be represented by α1, does not enter 
the indirect profit function, because it can only affect the profit indirectly through affecting 
q1. Surprisingly enough, however, simple algebra shows that the best response of owner 2 is 
neutral to q1 and consequently to α1, i.e., α2 = 1. This is surprising, because it is usual that 
the optimal decision is contingent on the previous moves (α1 and q1 in this case). Also, one 
could conjecture that owner 2 may be able to nullify the Stackelberg leadership of firm 1 by 
a credible threat of offering a contract inducing his manager to produce more aggressively. 
The threat is, however, never credible, because manager 1’s choice of Stackelberg output 
has a commitment value and so the subsequent contract of firm 2 cannot affect the choice 
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of manager 1, and would leave owner 2 worse off with the aggressive contract α2 < 1 than 
with α2 = 1.
Next, let us consider the decisions of firm 1 in the first stage. Given α1, the best response 
of manager 1 is given by
 
Again, this follows from maximising O
1




















Substituting equations (2) and (4) together with α2 = 1, we can compute the indirect profit 
function of firm 1 as follows:
 
and the first-order condition completes our analysis for this model.




 be the equilibrium contract and the equilibrium profit of 
firm i of Model Q - I. Then, (i) Q1
i












In equilibrium, both owners commit their managers to profit-maximising behaviour, that 
is, no sales-based delegation equilibrium occurs in the model of sequential firm decisions. 
Although firm 2 seems to be able to get out of the position of Stackelberg follower by offer-
ing a more aggressive contract to his manager, the owner does not offer such an incentive 
scheme. The intuition goes as follows. The owner of firm 2 is well aware that he cannot 
affect the output decision of firm 1, and that there is no better response to the Stackelberg 
quantity of firm 1 than the Stackelberg follower’s output (right on his original reaction curve 
associated with α2 = 1) that he can induce.
3 Firm 1 does not offer a sales-based contract 
either. The owner of firm 1 who wants π1 to be maximised knows that it is possible when 
his manager produces the quantity of a Stackelberg leader and in turn this is achieved only 
when his manager behaves as a profit maximiser himself. Thus, the owner must offer a 
contract that matches their interests exactly in order to implement the Stackelberg output, 
meaning that α1 = 1. Proposition 1-(ii) simply says that there is a first mover advantage, as 
is well known in the literature (see Figure 1).
3.2. Model of simultaneous delegation (Model Q - II)
In this model, the game begins with two firms’ simultaneous contracting with their man-
agers. Both contracts are assumed to be observable by two managers. Then, in the second 
stage, the managers of firm 1 and firm 2 choose their outputs q1 and q2 sequentially. Firm 
1 is still a Stackelberg leader in the second stage of output competition, although the two 
firms are in a symmetric position in the first stage of contract competition.
Given α1 and α2, the Stackelberg outcome in the second stage can be computed as a 
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These two equations suggest that if α2 < α1, i.e., firm 2 makes a more aggressive contract 
than firm 1, it is possible that q2 > q1, i.e., firm 1 may lose the advantage of a Stackelberg 
leader. Substituting equations (6) and (7) into profit functions, we obtain
 
 
From these two profit functions, we can find the best-response functions of owners given 
in equations (10) and (11), respectively:
 
 
Interestingly, it is optimal for the owner of firm 1 to commit his manager to profit maximis-
ing behaviour regardless of the rival firm’s contract (i.e., α1 = 1 is the dominant strategy for 
the owner of firm 1), whereas the optimal contract of firm 2 depends on the contract of firm 
1. This is because the owner of firm 1 knows from the argument provided in the previous 
subsection that he can implement the output of a Stackelberg leader without resorting to 
any sales-based delegation contract. Now, we have




 be the equilibrium contract and the equilibrium profit of 






































































Figure 1. EQ1 is the Equilibrium in model Q – i. source: author.
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Surprisingly, there is a second mover advantage even if firm 2 has no strategic advantage 
(in the sense that it is a symmetric mover in the first stage and a Stackelberg follower in the 
second stage).4 The intuition goes as follows. Firm 2 knows that firm 1 will choose α1 = 1 
(since it is the dominant strategy for firm 1) and that he can be made better off by using an 
aggressive contract. By such a contract, firm 2 can increase its output, while firm 1 has to 
reduce its output, because the outputs are strategic substitutes. As a result, firm 1’s profit is 






this model with linear demand. The main difference from Model Q - I is that the manager 
of firm 1 is aware that the reaction curve of firm 2 shifts outwards due to a more aggressive 
contract of firm 2, and so he must respond to the rival firm’s contract. Thus, firm 1 cannot 
behave as a Stackelberg leader any longer and firm 2 enjoys the second mover advantage by 
taking advantage of firm 2’s output response to firm 1’s contract (see Figure 2).
3.3. Model of sequential delegation (Model Q - III)
In this model, firm 1 behaves as a Stackelberg leader both in the first-stage contract compe-
tition and in the second-stage output competition. In the first stage, firm 1 first chooses its 
optimal contract and then firm 2 follows. In the second stage, too, firm 1 makes its output 
decision and then firm 2 follows.
The decisions in the second stage remain unaffected by the first-period sequential con-
tracting. Thus, we can focus only on the first-stage competition. As shown in equation (11), 
α2 is a strategic substitute to α1, implying that firm 2 responds optimally to a high value 
of α1 by a low value of α2. Therefore, by choosing a high value of α1, the owner of firm 1 
regains the first mover advantage but does not fully recover the profit of a Stackelberg leader. 
Formally, by substituting equations (6), (7) and (11) into (8), we can compute the indirect 
profit function of firm 1 as follows:
Figure 2. EQ2 is the Equilibrium in model Q – ii. source: author.
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 be the equilibrium contract and the equilibrium profit of 
































, which is due to firm 1’s strategic 
pre-commitment in its delegation contract. Also, in this equilibrium, both firms are made 
worse off than in Model Q - I in which both firms commit their managers to profit-maxim-
ising behaviour in equilibrium. This confirms the intuition of Fershtman and Judd (1987) 
and Sklivas (1987) that strategic delegations of both firms make both profits lower than in 
the Nash equilibrium profits of no delegation. Finally, the proof of this proposition provided 






 is the equilibrium output of firm i in Model 







, meaning that the manager of firm 1 is less aggressive.)
We summarise delegation contracts and profits of firms under quantity competition in 
Table 1. For firm 1, profits are higher in the order of Model Q - I to Model Q - III to Model 
Q - II. For firm 2, profits are higher in the order of Model Q - II to Model Q - I to Model 
Q - III.
4. Price competition
In this section, we consider a price competition in a differentiated good market. Again, we 
assume linear demand:
where 0 < b < 1 and 0 < c < a
1−b
. The first condition (0 < b < 1) implies that the demand for 
a product is more sensitive to a change in its own price than to a change in the competitor’s 
price. The second condition (0 < c < a
1−b
) is just to ensure positive sales (qi > 0).
4.1. Model of sequential firm decisions (Model P - I)
As in quantity competition, we first consider the decision problems that firm 2 faces. Given 




(a + 3c − 4c
1





qi = a − pi + bpj,
Table 1. Delegation contracts and profits of each firm under quantity competition.
Model
 Delegation Contract  Profit 
α1 α2 π1 π2
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by maximising O2 = (p2 - α2)q2 = (p2 - α2)(a - p2 - bp1). This yields the indirect profit function 
of firm 2 as follows:
 
Again, α1 can affect the profit of firm 2 only indirectly through p1. The first-order condition 
of this profit maximisation implies that the optimal contract for firm 2 is α2 = 1 as before. 
The intuition is clear. As in Section 3, the decision of firm 2 is neutral to the decision of firm 
1 in the sense that it cannot affect any foregone decision of firm 1. Therefore, it is optimal 
for the second mover to choose its best response to p1 which is on his reaction curve. This 
can be achieved by no sales-based delegation contract.
Now, consider the decision of firm 1. The objective function of the manager for firm 1 
is given by
 
From the first-order condition, it follows that the best response function of firm 1 is
 
Deriving the indirect profit function of firm 1 by substituting this into its profit function is 
tedious, but after straightforward calculations, we obtain
Proposition 4. Let P1i  and 
P1
i  be the equilibrium contract and the equilibrium profit of firm i of 












This proposition implies that both firms commit their managers to behaviour in accord 
with profit maximisation, just as in quantity competition. Also, note that there is a second 
mover advantage since prices are strategic complements, as Gal-Or (1985) showed. The intu-
ition for second mover advantage goes as follows. Firm 1 (first mover) raises its price very 
much to attain the highest profit possible (on the reaction curve of firm 2), which benefits 
firm 2 (second mover) more, since firm 2 only needs to undercut the rival price slightly.
4.2. Model of simultaneous delegation (Model P - II)
In this model, two firms set their prices sequentially after observing delegation contracts of 





























































a(4 + 2b − b2) + b(2 − b2)c
1
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Reaction curves of the owners can be found from the indirect profit functions obtained by 
substituting (17) and (18) into profit functions as follows:
 
 
Note that α2 is a strategic complement to α1 unlike in the case of quantity competition. 
Now, we have
Proposition 5. Let P2i  and 
P2
i  be the equilibrium contract and the equilibrium profit of 










As in Model Q  -  II, α1 = 1 is the dominant strategy for firm 1. Firm 2 commits the 
manager to less aggressive behaviour by a contract α2 > 1 to induce a higher price. It is also 
interesting that the first mover advantage appears in this model. Analogously to Model 
P - I, the second mover (firm 2) wants to raise its price (to earn more profit) by signing a 
contract (α2 > 1) committing the manager to less aggressive behaviour, but the first mover 
(firm 1) gains more by this price increase.
4.3. Model of sequential delegation (Model P - III)
The main issue in this model is whether the owner of firm 1 can increase its profit by 
pre-committing to a sales-based delegation contract (inducing the less aggressive behaviour 
of his manager) rather than passively playing the dominant strategy of the static delegation 
game (α1 = 1).
Given α1 and α2, Stackelberg prices remain the same as equations (17) and (18). Let 
us consider the first stage. Our intuition goes as follows. The owner of firm 1, who is a 
Stackelberg leader in contract competition, offers a contract α1 > 1 to induce less aggressive 






, since α2 is a strategic complement to α1. The following proposition shows 
that, as a result, the profit of firm 1 is increased, but interestingly the profit of firm 2 is 
increased more.
Proposition 6. Let P3i  and 
P3
i  be the equilibrium contract and the equilibrium profit of 











This proposition says that the second mover advantage reappears when Stackelberg 
leadership is allowed to firm 1 in contract competition as well.
(19)1 = 1,
(20)2 =
ab2(4 + 2b − b2) + 2(8 − 10b2 + 3b4)c + b3(2 − b2)c
1
(16 − 16b2 + 3b4)c
.
Table 2. Delegation contracts and profits of each firm under price competition.
Model
Delegation Contract Profit
α1 α2 π1 π2
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In Table 2, we summarise each firm’s delegation contracts and profits under price competi-







In this article, we have considered various models involving a Stackelberg leader and a 
Stackelberg follower in the output market, and examined under what circumstances the 
second mover advantage rather than the first mover advantage appears or disappears. It 







i  for i = 1, 2 regardless of first mover advantage or second mover advantage, 
while two firms’ preferences for sequences do not coincide under quantity competition. 
This raises the possibility of endogenising the sequence of firms’ decisions as interesting 
future research.
Notes
1.  The term ‘strategic delegation’, which was introduced by Schelling (1960) in a situation where 
delegation is used as a ‘self commitment device’, has received great attention in the industrial 
organisation literature since then.
2.  We do not lose generality by assuming linear contracts because Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1987) showed that linear contracts are optimal under some realistic conditions.
3.  In Figure 1, it does not help to induce, for example, E′ or E′′ by a contract α2 < 1 or α2 > 1. For 
it cannot change firm 1’s output.
4.  Bonatti and Martina (2004) and Kopel and Löffler (2008) also obtained similar findings.
Disclosure statement
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) Differentiating the indirect profit function of firm 2 given by equation 
(3) with respect to α2 leads to
Therefore, we obtain Q1
2
= 1. Similarly, differentiating equation (5) with respect to α1 yields
implying that Q1
1
= 1. (ii) Let qQ1
i


































.            ■










 by substituting (10) into (11). (ii) 
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 from equation (11). (ii) Let qQ3
i
 be the equi-




 into equations (6) and 































= 1 from the first-order conditions of 


































































2c(a + (1 − 2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[a(2 + b) − (4 − b − 2b2)c + (2 − b)2c
1
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= 1 into (14) and (21) yields





.           ■
















> 0.          ■
Proof of Proposition 6: (i) We have
(ii) Also, we have
Therefore, it follows that























ab2(4 + 2b − b2) + (16 − 20b2 + 2b3 + 6b4 − b5)c






(2 − b2)(8 + 4b − 4b2 − b3)2(a − (1 − b)c)2






(4 + 2b − b2)2(a − (1 − b)c)2






b4(8 + 4b − 4b2 − b3)(a − (1 − b)c)






b2(16 + 8b − 12b2 − 4b3 + b4)(a − (1 − b)c)






(8 + 4b − 4b2 − b3)2(a − (1 − b)c)2






(2 − b)(2 + b)3(4 − 3b2)(8 − 6b2 + b3)2(a − (1 − b)c)2








b7(64 + 64b − 48b2 − 48b3 + 8b4 + 7b5)(a − (1 − b)c)2
64(2 − b2)2(8 − 8b2 + b4)2
< 0
